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FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
that a cause of action for personal injury accrued only when the
plaintiff has reason to know that he had been injured. While in Young
the injury was not immediately recognized, the Fourth Circuit ap-
plied the same rationale in Portis where the cause of the injury "was
neither known nor reasonably detectable.
' 31 2
D. Workmen's Compensation
Because an employer had not made a good faith attempt to com-
ply with the requirements of the West Virginia Workmen's Compen-
sation Act, 3 3 the Fourth Circuit ruled in Fair v. Korhumel Steel and
Aluminum Co.3" that the employer was precluded from using the Act
as a bar to an employee's negligence action. The court also held that
by accepting money improperly tendered to him as a workmen's com-
pensation award, the employee had not waived his negligence claim.
One judge dissented in the case and admonished the court for being
overly technical in light of the legislative purpose behind the Act.
3 5
ANGELICA PRESTON DIDIER
WILLIAM BRUCE HAMILTON, JR.
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND THE USE OF
PUBLIC FACILITIES BY PRIVATE GROUPS WITH
DISCRIMINATORY MEMBERSHIP POLICIES:
NATIONAL SOCIALIST WHITE PEOPLE'S PARTY v.
RINGERS
During the last quarter century, judicial decisions have consis-
tently championed two constitutional values: the first amendment's
guarantee of free speech and peaceful assembly' and the fourteenth
amendment's proscription against state involvement in racial dis-
12483 F.2d at 673.
"W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-2-1 (1973).
"1473 F.2d 703 (4th Cir. 1973).
1'Id. at 707. (Bryan, J., dissenting).
'See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308
U.S. 147 (1939). While first amendment rights are of extreme importance, the Supreme
Court has ruled that they may be regulated under certain circumstances. For instance,
police may prevent a breach of the peace where a "speaker passes the bounds of
argument and undertakes incitement to riot .. "Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315,
321 (1951). See notes 28-30 infra and accompanying text.
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crimination of any sort.2 National Socialist White People's Party v.
Ringers' presented the Fourth Circuit with a unique situation-a
potential conflict between these two amendments. The court was
faced with deciding whether state participation in racial discrimina-
tion occurs when organizations with restrictive membership policies
are given access to public facilities regularly made available to pri-
vate groups for the exercise of first amendment rights. In a matter of
first impression, the court held4 that the first amendment interests
of free speech and peaceful assembly must prevail. 5 The Fourth Cir-
cuit ruled that the use of public facilities by private groups with
discriminatory membership policies does not constitute state involve-
ment in the groups' practices.
The dispute in Ringers arose from attempts by the National So-
cialist White People's Party, a successor of the American Nazi Party,
to rent facilities in a Virginia high school for the purpose of holding
political meetings.' Prior to 1970, the Party made two applications to
rent the Yorktown High School auditorium. Permission was denied
on both occasions. Finally, the Party was granted a rental permit to
hold a public meeting on March 7, 1970. The permit was subse-
quently revoked when the Party issued a news release announcing a
rally in the auditorium to which all interested members of the general
public were invited, with the exception of Jews and blacks.' On the
evening of the planned rally, a non-violent demonstration in protest
of the permit revocation was held outside the school building and
later at the home of the assistant superintendent of schools. Six party
members were arrested at the assistant superintendent's home for
violating a county noise ordinance?
All of the auditorium rental applications were made pursuant to
regulations promulgated by the Arlington County School Board. Vir-
ginia law permits local school boards to rent high school auditoriums
2See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1 (1948).
3473 F.2d 1010 (4th Cir. 1973).
'The ruling was a 6-1, en banc decision.
5473 F.2d at 1019.
'Id.
7Membership in the National Socialist White People's Party is open to all white
people who subscribe to the Party's doctrines. Among the purposes stated in the Party
charter is the goal of "gaining power in the United States by all legal means and the
elective process." National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, 473 F.2d 1010,
1019 (4th Cir. 1973) (Butzner, J., dissenting).
"Id. It should be noted that while the Party did not invite blacks and Jews, it would
not exclude them from public meetings if they sought admission. Id. at 1013.
'Id. at 1013.
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during non-school hours for lawful assemblies" as long as the effi-
ciency of the schools is not impaired." Before leasing auditorium
facilities, school boards are directed to adopt rules and regulations
necessary to protect all school property used for public assemblies.'
2
Accordingly, the Arlington County School Board issued regulations
under which it rented the Yorktown High School auditorium to or-
ganizations in "good standing."'
3
On April 3, 1970, the Party made a fourth request to rent the
auditorium. It was to be used for a private meeting, open only to
"card carrying members and official supporters,"' 4 at which Adolph
Hitler's eighty-first birthday was to be commemorated.' 5 The Board
denied the request without explanation. As a result, the Party insti-
tuted suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.'" It claimed that
refusal to grant the permit constituted "state action" violative of the
Party's first amendment rights of free speech and peaceful assembly.
The Party maintained that the permit denial constituted an impro-
per form of censorship and was therefore an invalid prior restraint of
first amendment activities. It further claimed that its fourteenth
amendment right to equal protection of the laws had been abridged.
7
The School Board defended on the grounds that the Party's pro-
posed meetings would likely result in violence and damage to school
facilities. The Board also contended that renting the auditorium to
the Party would foster and encourage the Party's discriminatory
membership policy and that the Board would thereby become in-
volved in that policy. In support of this latter contention, the Board
'OVA. CODE ANN. § 22-164 (Supp. 1973).
"VA. CODE ANN. § 22-164.1 (Repl. vol. 1973).
'VA. CODE ANN. § 22-164 (Supp. 1973).
'"Note 72 infra.
"473 F.2d at 1013.
'"National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, 429 F.2d 1269, 1270 (4th Cir.
1970). See note 16 infra.
"The history of the case is a long one. The district court refused the Party's request
for a preliminary injunction to prevent the School Board from denying the use of the
auditorium. National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, Civil No. 158-70-A
(E.D. Va., April 16, 1970). On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that there was no clear
abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of interlocutory relief. The circuit court
further ruled that the constitutional issues raised by the Party were not ripe for adjudi-
cation because of incomplete evidence and remanded the case for further hearing.
National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, 429 F.2d 1269, 1270 (4th Cir. 1970).
On remand, the district court ruled in favor of the School Board. National Socialist
White People's Party v. Ringers, Civil No. 158-70-A (E.D. Va., June 5, 1972). See note
21 infra and accompanying text. Throughout the entire three years of litigation, the
American Civil Liberties Union was of counsel appeared on brief for the Party.
"7473 F.2d at 1012.
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stressed that whenever a state places its power or prestige behind
discriminatory acts or omissions,18 the fourteenth amendment "state
action" doctrine is invoked to prevent the use of state authority to
further such discrimination. 1 As an arm of the state government, the
School Board therefore argued that the "state action" doctrine re-
quired denial of the use of a public auditorium to political organiza-
tions with restrictive membership policies.2" The district court found
"See, e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970); Reitman v. Mulkey,
387 U.S. 369 (1967); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961);
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
""State action" required under the fourteenth amendment has consistently been
treated the same as "under color" of state law required by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966), citing Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S.
461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Smith v. Holiday Inns, 336 F.2d
630 (6th Cir. 1964); Simkins v. Cone Memorial Hospital, 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964); Hampton v. Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 911 (1962); Boman v. Birmingham Transit Co., 280 F.2d 531 (5th
Cir. 1960); Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326
U.S. 721 (1945).
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961), sets forth what is
probably the most quoted "state action" test:
["State action" occurs whenever a statel has so far insinuated itself
into a position of interdependence [with an otherwise private person
whose conduct allegedly violated the Fourteenth Amendment] that
it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity,
which, on that account, cannot be considered to have been so "purely
private" as to fall without the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.
365 U.S. at 725; see United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966); cf. Evans v.
Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964); Griffin v.
Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963); Peterson
v. Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963); Pennsylvania v. Board of Trusts, 353 U.S. 230
(1957); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak,
343 U.S. 451 (1952); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950);
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
2"While appearing in neither the court record nor the School Board's brief, it seems
very likely that the Board felt it was faced with the following dilemma:
(a) On one hand, it could grant the Party's rental permit applica-
tion. After the news release publicizing the proposed March 7, 1970,
meeting (note 8 supra and accompanying text), renting the audito-
rium would almost certainly have resulted in a suit by black civil
rights groups claiming that the Board aided the Party's racist aims by
providing a meeting place for a nominal fee-i.e., a fourteenth amend-
ment "state action" claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970); or
(b) It could deny a rental permit and risk a possible suit by the
Party.
Admittedly, a civil rights group might have difficulty showing injury and thus encoun-
ter standing problems in trying to sue the Board. However, since the Party had shown
no inclination to resort to the courts after the previous permit denials, it is understand-
able why the Board chose once again to deny the rental permit request.
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both of the Board's defenses valid and ruled that denial of the rental
application was justified.
2 '
Thus, in National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, the
Fourth Circuit was actually confronted with three questions. First,
what constitutes a valid regulation of first amendment rights? Sec-
ond, does the fourteenth amendment "state action" doctrine have
any application where the use of facilities effectively dedicated to
first amendment rights is involved? Third, where public facilities
have been made available on a first-come first-served basis to a vari-
ety of organizations, does denial of their use to one certain organiza-
tion constitute a denial of that organization's fourteenth amendment
right to equal protection of the laws? Because of the circuit court's
conclusions on the first amendment and "state action" issues, it did
not reach this third question.
2 2
First Amendment Rights and Government Regulation: Prior Re-
straint or Subsequent Punishment?
The Fourth Circuit in Ringers first considered the question of
what constitutes a valid regulation, or proper prior restraint, of first
amendment activities; i.e., under what circumstances may a state
circumscribe the rights of free speech and peaceful assembly?
Courts have consistently held that streets, parks, and other public
places are "held in trust" for public purposes of assembly and com-
munication of views on matters of general concern. 3 In essence, they
-'National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, Civil No. 158-70-A (E.D. Va.,
June 5, 1972).
'-'The Board agreed to the following stipulation with regard to the Party's alleged
denial of equal protection:
Over the past several years, the School Board has granted permit
requests to hold both private and public meetings, on a continuing
basis, to a wide variety of in-county and out-of-county organizations
(including groups whose membership does not include certain racial
or religious affiliations). Groups which have rented facilities include
the Democratic Party, the Republican Party and other political, reli-
gious, civic and fraternal organizations .... Except for a few instan-
ces involving groups which had previously damaged school property
during a prior usage, no group has been denied the use of an available
facility with the exception of the Party. Uses have included dances,
meetings, religious services and a wide variety of other uses.
473 F.2d at 1013-14 n.2 (emphasis added). Because of this stipulation, the Fourth
Circuit stated that it was therefore uncertain whether or not denial of the rental permit
application also involved abridgement of the Party's fourteenth amendment right to
equal protection of the laws. However, it did not pursue the question because of its
first amendment conclusions. 473 F.2d at 1013-14 n.2.
2473 F.2d at 1014-15, quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939).
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are public forums dedicated to the exercise of first amendment
rights.24 However, the privilege of using public forums and facilities
is not unlimited or absolute. First amendment rights must be exer-
cised in consonance with peace and good order.2 5 Thus, the use of
public facilities may be regulated in the interest of all;26 but first
amendment rights may not be abridged or denied in the guise of
regulation.
2 7
In Brandenburg v. Ohio,"2 the Supreme Court held that a statute
restraining the rights of free speech and assembly must distinguish
between "mere advocacy" and "incitement to imminent lawless ac-
tion," regulating or punishing only the latter.29 "A statute which fails
to draw this distinction impermissibly intrudes upon the freedoms
guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amendments [and is therefore
invalid]. It sweeps within its condemnation speech which. . . [the]
Constitution has immunized from governmental control."
2
3
Against this background, the Fourth Circuit in Ringers examined
the School Board's defense that the Party's proposed meetings would
likely result in violence and damage to school facilities. The court
adopted the Seventh Circuit's decision in Collin v. Chicago Park
District" and found the Board's defense "lacking in merit.2 32 Collin,
which also dealt with a controversy involving a successor to the Amer-
ican Nazi Party, discussed prior restraints at great length. In that
case, there was evidence that the Party had used violent force in
harassing peace demonstrators, and it was on this basis that the Park
-'Notes 50-53 infra and accompanying text.
2:,Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939). The Hague court also held that first
amendment rights must be exercised "in subordination to the general comfort and
convenience .... " Id. This language appears to be rather broad in light of more
recent holdings. See notes 28-47 infra and accompanying text. However, governmental
bodies are permitted to designate certain areas of a park for such things as picnics to
the exclusion of other activities. Collin v. Chicago Park Dist., 460 F.2d 746 (7th Cir.
1972). They may also make and enforce regulations to promote the free flow of traffic
on public streets. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
:'Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S.
290 (1951); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
"A state may not unduly suppress free communication of views, religious or
other, under the guise of conserving desirable conditions." Feiner v. New York, 340
U.S. 315, 320 (1951), quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940); Hague
v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 516 (1939).
-395 U.S. 444 (1969) (Ohio criminal syndicalism statute ruled invalid).
"Id. at 448.
1"Id., citing Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299
U.S. 353 (1937); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
31460 F.2d 746 (7th Cir. 1972).
"473 F.2d at 1014.
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
District premised its denial of the requested park area. The District
did offer four alternative sites in distant parks where it felt that
onlookers would be unlikely to react violently to the Party's exhorta-
tions. Such action was found invalid by the Seventh Circuit for three
reasons. First, the requested park area had been previously used by
public speakers, and the alternative sites removed the party from the
area in which it was likely to draw the largest number of supporters.
Meeting at one of the alternative sites would therefore have weakened
the meeting's effect and crippled the Party's plea to some degree,
both results serving to infringe upon the Party's first amendment
rights.? Second, the Park District presented inadequate evidence to
allow a "well-founded belief" that violence would occur. 4 Finally, the
court stated that the existence of a hostile audience does not justify
the restraint of otherwise legal first amendment activities.3 1 It em-
phasized that the "expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely
because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of the hearers.
'36
As pointed out in Collin, the Supreme Court has often stated that
any system of prior restraints bears "a heavy presumption against its
constitutional validity. 31 Such systems require concrete evidence of
their necessity; undifferentiated fear or foreboding of violence is inad-
equate to permit regulation of first amendment rights.38 Therefore,
-460 F.2d at 752.
:"Id. at 754.
15Id., citing Greogry v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969); Terminello v. Chicago, 337
U.S. 1 (1949). See also Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615 (1971); Street v. New
York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551-53 (1965); Edwards
v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 238 (1963); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
311 (1940). If hostile audiences were a basis for restraining first amendment activity,
the following situation would exist:
[Tihe right of . . . people to gather in public places for social or
political purposes would be continually subject to summary suspen-
sion through the good faith enforcement of a prohibition against an-
noying conduct. And such a prohibition, in addition, contains an ob-
vious invitation to discriminatory enforcement against those whose
association together is "annoying" because their ideas, their lifestyle,
or their physical appearance is resented by the majority of their fellow
citizens.
Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615-16 (1971) (footnotes omitted).
3460 F.2d at 755, quoting Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969). See also
Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564, 567 (1970).
17New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971); Organization
for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S.
51, 57 (1965); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963); Near v. Minne-
sota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931).
2Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 191 (1972), citing Tinker v. Des Moines Ind.
Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
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free speech and assembly may only be circumscribed where there is
a "clear and present danger" that violence will result. 9 It is solely
where "there are special, limited circumstances in which speech is so
interlaced with burgeoning violence that it is not protected by the
broad guarantee of the First Amendment."40
While Collin, Brandenburg, and other pertinent cases"' all seem
to address the regulation, restraint, or curtailment of first amend-
ment rights, it is implicit in those cases that governmental interven-
tion is constitutionally justified only when it deals with the abuse of
those privileges.42 Consequently, the most effective and most consis-
tently upheld means of dealing with first amendment abuses is in
their punishment, not in the restraint of first amendment activities
from which abuses may arise. 3 This is so even where the exercise of
"'Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). "The question in every case is
whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent." Id. Mr. Justice Holmes' "clear and present danger"
test has received almost universal acceptance. However, it should be remembered that
the test was enunciated during World War I. Mr. Justice Douglas contends that the
"clear and present danger" standard can be justified only under the War Power, if at
all. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 450-55 1969) (Douglas, J., concurring).
The "balancing test" is also used in some cases concerning the first amendment.
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939). However, it is properly used only where
first amendment rights are of tangential importance, such as cases involving statutes
which regulate personal activities or require disclosure of membership lists. It has been
strongly suggested by Mr. Justice Black that the "balancing test" is inappropriate in
all situations, regardless of the circumstances. See Franz, The First Amendment in the
Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962).
1"473 F.2d at 1015, quoting Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 180 (1968)
(emphasis added). See also notes 28-30 supra and accompanying text.
"See note 37 supra.
"2Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 541, 171 P.2d 885,
889 (1946), citing DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937).
"Statutes designed to prevent activities which are constitutionally subject to state
regulation are often drawn in unnecessarily broad terms. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly found such statutes invalid. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S.
288, 307-08 (1964); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463-65 (1958).
See also notes 58-63 infra and accompanying text. Even those statutes which are drawn
in sufficiently narrow terms may be broadened through improper administration and
thereby become unconstitutionally broad. See notes 71-72 infra and accompanying
text. The effects of improper administration are neutralized when proper procedural
safeguards are provided. See notes 54-72 infra and accompanying text. However, be-
cause of the dangers inherent in any system of prior restraints, the most consistently
upheld method of regulating first amendment activities is the proper subsequent pun-
ishment of abuses arising from those activities. The Supreme Court's statement in
Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951), illustrates this point: "There are appropriate
public remedies to protect the peace and order of the community if appellant's
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first amendment rights results in a situation likely to arouse passions
or cause recriminations. "There is nothing new in the fact that
charges of reprehensible conduct [or allegations of racial superior-
ity] may create resentment and the disposition to resort to violent
means of redress, but this well-understood tendency did not alter the
determination to protect [individuals and] the press against censor-
ship and restraint . . . ."I Thus, the expression of racist and anti-
semitic views in public places is a right protected against restraint
and censorship; free speech may not be circumscribed on the grounds
that the message is unpopular or distasteful. 5 If the exercise of first
amendment rights results in abuse or violence, appropriate remedies
exist to protect the public interests of peace and good order. 6 In short,
because of the possible imposition of invalid prior restraints by courts
and administrative bodies, the solution for abuse of first amendment
rights lies not in regulation but in proper subsequent punishment.
4 7
Ringers confronted the Fourth Circuit with an excellent example
of administrative regulations arbitrarily applied at the prior restraint
stage; the Board employed its auditorium rental provisions so as to
deny administratively the Party's first amendment rights. The vacu-
ity of the School Board's contention that permitting the Party to use
speeches should result in disorder or violence." 340 U.S. at 294; DeJonge v. Oregon,
299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715 (1931). See Blasi, Prior
Restraints on Demonstrations, 68 MIcH. L. REv. 1481, 1518-19 (1970).
"Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 722 (1931). In Near, Mr. Chief Justice Hughes
wrote that the first amendment guaranty of a free press was provided because the
power of a government to prevent publication is a "more serious public evil" than any
scandal that words may produce. Id. He alluded to the history of the first amendment
in a quote from Madison:
To prohibit the intent to excite those unfavorable sentiments against
those who administer the Government, is equivalent to a prohibition
of the actual excitement of them; and to prohibit the actual excite-
ment of them is equivalent to a prohibition of discussions having that
tendency and effect; which, again, is equivalent to a protection of
those who administer the Government, if they should at any time
deserve the contempt or hatred of the people, against being exposed
to it by free animadversions on their characters and conduct.
Id., quoting REPORT ON VIRGINIA'S RESOLUTIONS, MADISON'S WORKS, vol. iv, 549 (1788).
"Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); Communist Party v. Subversive
Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 137 (1961); Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents,
360 U.S. 684, 689 (1959); Collin v. Chicago Park Dist., 460 F.2d 746, 754 (7th Cir. 1972).
See note 35 supra and note 85 infra.
"Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 294 (1951); cf. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697,
717 (1931), quoting Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 304, 313 (1820):
"The liberty of the press was to be unrestrained, but he who used it was to be responsi-
ble in case of its abuse."
'7Note 43 supra.
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the high school would result in violence and damage to school facili-
ties is shown by the trial stipulations. In the stipulations, the Board
agreed that other than the Party's action following revocation of the
rental permit for the March 7, 1970, meeting, it knew of no other
violent acts by the Party.9 However, even the March 7 demonstration
was non-violent, and it should further be noted that the Party was
protesting the denial of its asserted right to use the auditorium. To
have held that denial of the Party's first amendment rights could be
justified on the basis of a subsequent demonstration in protest of that
denial would have been anomalous. 9
That the Board found the Party's program distasteful is quite
understandable; but once a school's doors are opened for public pur-
poses, "tickets of admission" in the form of acceptable convictions
and affiliations clearly cannot be demanded 9 The Fourth Circuit
found that the Board's repeated exercise of discretionary authority to
rent the Yorktown High School auditorium for non-school purposes
constituted "an effective dedication of the auditorium for the exercise
of first amendment rights .. .[making it] conceptually indistin-
guishable for first amendment purposes . . .[from such 'public
places' as] streets and parks, which too, are acquired and maintained
at public expense."'5 1 The court's determination that the Board had
effectively caused the auditorium to become a public forum meant
"National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, 473 F.2d 1010, 1014 n.3
(4th Cir. 1973).
"United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
1"Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 543, 171 P.2d 885,
892 (1946). States are not permitted to impose unconstitutional requirements as condi-
tions for granting privileges. This is true even where the privilege in question is the
use of state property. 28 Cal. 2d at 542, 171 P.2d at 891; Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105, 110-11 (1943); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939); Frost v. Railroad
Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 594 (1926). See Ellis v. Allen, 165 N.Y.S.2d 624, 626 (App. Div.
1957), appeal dismissed, 4 N.Y.2d 693, 171 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1958): "School authorities
may, if they choose, close the door to all outside organizations, but if they open the
door they must treat alike all organizations in the same category." See also Fowler v.
Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 69 (1953) (first amendment rights of Jehovah's Witnesses);
Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 272-73 (1951) (first amendment rights of Jeho-
vah's Witnesses); Collin v. Chicago Park Dist., 460 F.2d 746 (7th Cir. 1972) (first
amendment rights and use of public park facilities by National Socialist Party);
United States v. Crowthers, 456 F.2d 1074, 1079 (4th Cir. 1972) (public use of Pentagon
areas may be regulated as long as it is done with fine impartiality).
5'473 F.2d at 1014 (footnotes omitted). "Censorship of those who would use the
school building as a forum cannot be rationalized by r ference to its setting. School
desks and blackboards, like trees or street lights, are but the trappings of the forum;
what imports is the meeting of minds and not the meeting place." Id. at 1015 n.7,
quoting Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 543, 171 P.2d 885,
892 (1946). See text accompanying notes 23-24 supra.
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
the Party could not be barred without a showing that its meetings
would result in "imminent lawless action" or "violence." Finding
that the Board failed to carry its burden of proof that the Party acted
violently,5 2 the court ruled the denial of the rental permit application
was an invalid prior restraint of the Party's first amendment rights.53
The School Board could have denied the Party's request only if it
had acted in complete accordance with properly drawn regulations.
In order for a statute or an administrative regulation to vest valid
restraining control over first amendment rights, it must fulfill the
requirements of procedural due process. Only with procedural safe-
guards designed to eliminate the dangers of censorship can a system
of prior restraints avoid constitutional infirmity." A review of perti-
nent cases reveals five basic requirements which must be met. 5
First, because prior restraints are "fraught with danger and
viewed with suspicion,"56 statutes and regulations establishing them
57he burden of proving that a prior restraint is proper rests with the state. "Where
the transcendent value of speech is involved, due process certainly requires ... that
the State bear the burden of persuasion to show that the appellants engaged in crimi-
nal speech." Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958). See Healy v. James, 408 U.S.
169, 184 (1972); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965); NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415, 437-38 (1963); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293-94 (1951). Note that
Speiser involved a criminal statute while Ringers does not. However, this difference is
not a valid ground for distinction since in both cases the state tried to suppress first
amendment activities. "[I]t is immaterial that it sought to accomplish that objective
in the one case by threat of punishment and in the other by censorship." Danskin v.
San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 538, 171 P.2d 885, 896 (1946). See also
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 516 (1939);
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715 (1931).
'Even private property is not immune from the reach of the first amendment and
may be found to constitute a "public forum." Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan
Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968) (union may picket within shopping center
boundaries); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (company town may not proscribe
right of Jehovah's Witnesses to distribute religious literature). Whenever an owner
opens his property to the public for his own advantage his private property rights
become subordinate to the statutory and constitutional rights possessed by those using
the property. 326 U.S. at 506. But see Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972)
(strictly limiting Logan Valley Plaza decision to its facts; distribution of handbills may
be forbidden when unrelated to any activity within shopping mall).
"Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181 (1968), citing Freedman v. Maryland,
380 U.S. 51, 57 (1965).
=Along with the five demands of procedural due process, it should also be remem-
bered that courts have very liberal standing requirements when first amendment rights
are at issue. "In the area of freedom of expression it is well established that one has
standing to challenge a statute on the ground that it delegates overly broad licensing
discretion to an administrative office, whether or not his conduct could be proscribed
by a properly drawn statute, and whether or not he applied for a license." Freedman
v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 56 (1965).
"'Id. at 57.
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must be drawn in the narrowest possible terms that will accomplish
their particular objective. ',7 Officials may not be given broad discre-
tion as to whether permits will issue.5' Statutes which are designed
to prevent interference with the normal utilization of streets, parks,
and other public places have generally been upheld;5 but licensing
systems which grant administrative officials power to withhold per-
mits based on broad criteria unrelated to the proper and essential
regulation of public places have received consistent condemnation.0
For example, the Supreme Court has invalidated ordinances which
used such phrases as "may be granted . . . by the police commis-
sioner .... "" "[t]he commission shall grant . . . unless in its
judgment . . . ,12 and "[i]t shall be unlawful. . . to assemble...
in a manner annoying . "...63
The second requirement of procedural due process is that a permit
application must be decided quickly. This is especially true where
political questions are involved, for "timing is of the essence in poli-
tics." 4 Third, notice must be given of the decision and a prompt
explanation must be provided if a permit request is denied." Fourth,
1Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183 (1968).
5'Permitting an individual to refuse a permit on the mere "opinion that such
refusal will prevent 'riots, disturbances, or disorderly assemblage' . . . can . . . be
made the instrument of arbitrary suppression of free expression of views on national
affairs for the prohibition of all speaking will undoubtedly 'prevent' such eventuali-
ties." Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 516 (1939).
"Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
"'Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 294 (1951). See note 43 supra. "Where state
action designed to regulate prohibitable action also restricts associational rights...
the State must demonstrate that the action taken is reasonably related to protection
of the State's interest and that 'the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.' " Healy v.
James, 408 U.S. 169, 189-90 n.20 (1972), quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 377 (1968).
"Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 291 n.1 (1951) (emphasis added).
'2Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 149 (1969) (emphasis added).
OCoates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) (emphasis added).
"Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 163 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring).
",Collin v. Chicago Park Dist., 460 F.2d 746, 756-57 (7th Cir. 1972).
11460 F.2d at 756. In providing explanations, the government must be consistent.
It "may not permit public meetings in support of government policy and at the same
time forbid public meetings that are opposed to that policy. It may not accomplish its
selective objective by convenient labelling: good ones are religious services and bad
ones are demonstrations." United States v. Crowthers, 456 F.2d 1074, 1079 (4th Cir.
1972). "Only a specific intent to cause violence, directed to the specific demonstration
and manifested by specific plans, should suffice for a permit refusal or injunction; a
general intent extrapolated from rhetoric or previous exploits should not be enough.
Concrete evidence should be required." Collin v. Chicago Park Dist., 460 F.2d 746, 754
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the state must bear the burden of proving that the imposition of a
prior restraint is proper." Consequently, once a negative decision is
rendered, the governmental body is required to seek an immediate
judicial determination of the merits of a permit application.
6
1
"[Qinly a procedure requiring a judicial determination suffices to
impose a valid final restraint. ' 69 The fifth and last requirement is
that proceedings may not be ex parte.0
Measured against the requisites of procedural due process, it is
apparent that the regulations promulgated by the School Board in
Ringers were inadequate. 7' They did meet the requirement that stat-
utes and regulations establishing prior restraints be narrowly drawn.
After receiving the rental fee in advance, high school principals were
to issue permits for the use of school auditoriums to organizations in
"good standing," which was defined as "no previous record of abuse
to school facilities. ' 7 2 The provision was not discretionary, yet the
(7th Cir. 1972), quoting Blasi, Prior Restraints on Demonstrations, 68 MicH. L. Rv.
1481, 1509 (1970) (footnote omitted; emphasis in original).
'7 See note 52 supra.
"Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965); Collin v. Chicago Park Dist.,
460 F.2d 746, 756 (7th Cir. 1972). The Collin court said that it was hesitant to require
that governmental bodies resort to the courts every time they decide that a permit for
the use of a public forum should be denied. Nevertheless, it held that the requirement
was a necessary part of the safeguards dictated by procedural due process. 460 F.2d at
756. One exception to the "immediate judicial determination rule" has been permit-
ted. The Supreme Court has held that films differ from other forms of expression. As
a result of the unique nature of the film industry, longer time limits for judicial
determinations are permitted. However, a court decision is still necessary within a
reasonable time. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 61 (1965).
Mr. Justice Harlan has argued that in the case of obscenity prompt judicial review
is not of the essence: "[Tihe subject of sex is of constant but rarely particularly topical
interest. Distribution of Ulysses may be thought by some to be more important for
society than distribution of the daily newspaper, but a one or two-month delay in
circulation of the former would be of small significance whereas such a delay might
be effective suppression of the latter." A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205,
224-25 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
c'Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965). See A Quantity of Books v.
Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963);
Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367
U.S. 717 (1961).
7'Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 180, 182-83 (1968); A Quantity of Books
v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1964).
7 1The inadequacies of the Board's regulations were not discussed by the Fourth
Circuit. However, the court adopted the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Collin as part of
its own, and a somewhat similar regulation was in question there. See notes 31-40 supra
and accompanying text.
"The pertinent portions of the "Regulations Governing the Use of School Facilities
by Outside Groups" which were in effect in early 1970 read as follows:
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Party's application was rejected even though it had never damaged
school property. Furthermore, the Board provided no explanation of
why the permit was denied. The arbitrary nature of the decision
vividly illustrates the necessity for procedural safeguards-including
a final judicial determination-where first amendment rights are in-
volved.
The First Amendment-Fourteenth Amendment Conflict: Does the
"State Action" Doctrine Apply Where Views Inimical to Fourteenth
Amendment Values Are Expressed in Publicly Financed Forums?
The most significant issue in Ringers was whether the fourteenth
amendment "state action" doctrine has any application where the
exercise of first amendment rights is involved; i.e., must public places
regularly utilized by private groups be made available to all groups,
regardless of their racial and religious beliefs or policies?
Courts have consistently held that "state action" exists where
private parties discriminate on the basis of race against a backdrop
of state compulsion or involvement.13 Once "state action" which fos-
ters or encourages private racial discrimination is found, the state is
considered a partner in the challenged activity, and the fourteenth
amendment forbids the private individual to discriminate in carrying
out his enterprise or activity.7 However, the existence of "state ac-
tion" can only be determined in relation to the facts and circumstan-
ces of each particular case.75 Neither the Supreme Court nor any
other court has ever "attempted the 'impossible task' of formulating
an infallible test for determining whether the State 'in any of its




In examining the School Board's "state action" defense, the
1. GENERAL. The public school buildings of Arlington County are
available to community groups at any time when the facilities to be
used are not required for school purposes ...
2. RENTAL PERMIT AND PAYMENT. If the applying organiza-
tion is in good standing (no previous record of abuse to school
facilities), the principal on receipt of FULL ADVANCE PAYMENT
• ..will issue a PERMIT FOR USE OF SCHOOL BUILDING ....
(Emphasis added.) Brief for Appellant, Appendix at 24, National Socialist White
People's Party v. Ringers, 473 F.2d 1010 (4th Cir. 1973).
7'Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 169 (1970); see note 18 supra.
7'Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.8 715, 725 (1961); see notes 18,
19 supra.
71365 U.S. at 726.
'7Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378 (1967).
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Fourth Circuit discussed Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority.7
In Burton, a municipality owned and operated a publicly financed
parking facility and leased space to commercial businesses, one of
which was a restaurant with a "whites only" policy. The Supreme
Court found that the city had "so far insinuated itself into a position
of interdependence with [the restaurant] that it must be recognized
as a joint participant [in the restaurant's refusal to serve blacks]
. . . .77 By inaction, the city had effectively placed its power, prop-
erty, and prestige behind the restaurant's exclusionary practices. 7 In
other words, the city was something less than a neutral party, and
its knowing acquiescence in the restaurant's "whites only" policy
caused that discrimination to acquire a public character. As the
Fourth Circuit pointed out, however, Burton dealt with a purely com-
mercial activity; first amendment rights were not at issue.80
In contrast, Ringers concerned a private organization which
sought to exercise its privileges of free speech and assembly in a
publicly owned forum. The court characterized the situation as one
where the state was required to be neutral and where denial of the
auditorium's use would greatly impair the exercise of the Party's first
amendment rights.8 ' Referring to Healy v. James,82 the court held
that the Party, like all political organizations, was "entitled to first
amendment protections, including the use of facilities for meetings
and other appropriate purposes."' ' As Healy, Colin, and a number
365 U.S. 715 (1961).
71Id. at 725. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966). "Conduct that is formally
'private' may become so entwined with governmental policies or so impregnated with
a governmental character as to become subject to the constitutional limitations placed
upon state action." 382 U.S. at 299.
7'Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961).
-National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, 473 F.2d 1010, 1017 (1973).
The statement that Burton dealt with a purely commercial activity should not be
construed to mean that there is no such thing as "commercial speech." Though adver-
tising is a form of speech, it is not protected by the broad guaranty of the first amend-
ment. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412
U.S. 94 (1973) (broadcasters not required to accept paid editorial advertisements);
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973)
("purely commercial advertising" not protected by the first amendment; newspapers
may be forbidden to carry sex designated advertising).
11473 F.2d at 1017.
-408 U.S. 169 (1972). In this case, the refusal by a state supported college to
recognize a local S.D.S. chapter and afford it the use of campus facilities for its
meetings was held to be without proper justification and a potential denial of first
amendment rights. The case was remanded for further hearing.
'"National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, 473 F.2d 1010, 1017 (1973),
citing Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181 (1972).
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of other cases," unequivocally demonstrate, protection is not denied
simply because the general populace finds a political group's message
repulsive or antithetical .
'
1
The Ringers court found the situation confronting it comparable
to that in Everson v. Board of Education." In Everson, the Supreme
Court permitted New Jersey to pay the transportation costs of chil-
dren attending parochial schools, finding the service similar to such
general government services as police and fire protection, sewer
connections, highways, and sidewalks . 7 Providing the transportation
service did not exceed the bounds prescribed by the first amendment
prohibition against laws "respecting the establishment of religion;"
hence, the state had not violated the constitutional requirement that
it be neutral in religious matters."s Similarly, the Fourth Circuit
found that while the fourteenth amendment prohibits "Virginia from
practicing the discrimination which the Party practices, the first
amendment also prohibits [the state] from hampering its citizens in
the exercise of their right to speak and assemble freely by denying a
generally provided public forum." 9 Consequently, the court ruled
that the School Board was required to provide the auditorium upon
proper application by any group. °
It was on this point that Judge Butzner based his very appealing
dissent. He stated that it was "the Party's exclusion of black citizens,
not its [racist and anti-semitic] message, that justified the Board's
refusal to rent the auditorium."l His general contention was that the
adoption of three civil rights amendments and the enactment of a
series of laws designed to "secure civil rights affirm our national goal
of eradicating all government-fostered racial discrimination."' 2 He
maintained that it is within a framework of nondiscrimination that
political parties must exercise their first amendment rights.1
3
"'Notes 35 and 45 supra.
' "I do not believe that it can be too often repeated that the freedom of speech,
press, petition, and assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment must be accorded
to the ideas we hate or sooner or later they will be denied to the ideas we cherish."
National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, 473 F.2d 1010, 1015 n.8 (4th Cir.
1972), quoting Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 137
(1961) (Black, J., dissenting), cited with approval, Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 188
(1972); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
-330 U.S. 1 (1947).
,"Id. at 17-18.
sId. at 18.
"National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, 473 F.2d 1010, 1017 (4th Cir.
1973).
111d. at 1018.




In developing this argument, the dissent cited a large number of
cases in which the Supreme Court invalidated a variety of devices
utilized to exclude blacks from participation in the political process.
Judge Butzner asserted that those decisions,94 which included the
White Primary Cases,5 implicitly teach that when "state action" is
united with political organizations which bar black people from full
political participation, "the union is illegal despite the first amend-
ment rights possessed by white members of the organization.""6 The
point is irrefutable, but it must be recognized that all of the cases
cited arose against a backdrop of state statutory requirements and
state enforcement. One group of cases concerned statutes designed to
exclude blacks from voting rolls. 7 The other group dealt with political
parties performing the essential state function of running election
"Judge Butzner cited South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 311-12 (1966),
as a catalogue of devices used to exclude blacks from the political process. Though
some of the cases enumerated involved the fifteenth rather than the fourteenth amend-
ment, he contended that the distinction was not a critical one since both amendments
forbid racial discrimination which is "tainted by state action." 473 F.2d at 1021.
Katzenbach listed the following devices:
Grandfather clauses were invalidated in Guinn v. United States, 238
U.S. 347 (1915), and Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915). Proce-
dural hurdles were struck down in Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939)
.... Improper challenges were nullified in United States v. Thomas,
362 U.S. 58 (1960). Racial gerrymandering was forbidden by Gomillion
v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S 339 (1960). Finally, discriminatory application
of voting tests was condemned in Schnell v. Davis, 336 U.S. 933
(1949), Alabama v. United States, 371 U.S. 37 (1962), and Louisiana
v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
473 F.2d at 1021 n.2, quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 311-12
(1966).
To the cases listed in Katzenbach, the dissent added Hadnott v. Amos, 394 U.S.
358 (1969), which voided discriminatory application of a corrupt practices act by
invoking the first, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments. The dissent also cited Nixon
v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (Texas law prohibiting black voters in Democratic
Party primaries invalid under fourteenth amendment), and Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S.
73 (1932) (rules of Texas State Executive Committee of the Democratic Party prohibit-
ing black voters in party primary invalid under fourteenth amendment). 473 F.2d at
1021 n.2. Herndon and Condon are normally included as part of the White Primary
Cases. See note 95 infra.
' sTerry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944);
Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932). . . .473 F.2d at 1021 n.3. Though not included
by the dissent, Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927), is also generally considered to
be one of the White Primary Cases. The dissent did include Herndon in an extensive
footnote which listed a series of devices used to exclude blacks from the political
process. See note 94 supra.
11473 F.2d at 1021.
'7Note 94 supra.
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primaries, thereby becoming adjuncts of the state government."5 In
both groups state law enforced and encouraged discrimination, either
directly or indirectly. Consequently, blacks were excluded from polit-
ical participation. In Ringers, such was not the case. Virginia did not
try to exclude blacks from either voting rolls or Party membership,
nor was the Party running a primary as an adjunct of the state gov-
ernment.99 In spite of the Party's discriminatory membership policies,
it cannot be said that it acted either alone or in conjunction with state
law to abridge the right of others to vote or participate in govern-
ment.""' Thus, the cases are inapposite."'
'Note 95 supra.
9'rhe internal affairs of political parties are generally immune from governmental
regulation. However, a three judge district court recently held that where a state grants
political parties the power to conduct primary elections and to select their national
convention delegates in those primaries, rules promulgated by the political parties are
subject to the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973c (Supp. 1972). MacGuire
v. Amos, 343 F. Supp. 119 (M.D. Ala. 1972). Section 5 of the Act requires certain states
and their subdivisions to obtain federal approval before changing any voting stan-
dards, practices, or procedures. See Comment, MacGuire v. Amos: Application of
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act to Political Parties, 8 HARV. Civ. RTS. L. REv. 199
(1973).
'"'473 F.2d at 1016-17.
'"'One might argue that providing the auditorium at a nominal fee is a form of
state subsidy which aids the Party in promoting its message of racial superiority.
Subsidies which encourage and finance schemes of racial segregation are void. For
instance, states are prohibited from supplying textbooks to schools which exclude
students on the basis of race. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973). However,
where first amendment rights are involved, the state is required to maintain strict
neutrality, giving all groups equal access to public facilities. See notes 81-90 supra and
accompanying text. Denying a private group the use of public facilities because of its
views would be a violation of that neutrality and an imposition of a form of censorship.
See notes 121-26 infra and accompanying text.
Furthermore, a claim that other, privately owned facilities are available for the
exercise of the Party's first amendment rights would also be invalid. "[Olne is not to
have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea
that it may be exercised in some other place." Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163
(1939).
The use of public facilities for the purposes of free speech and assembly is some-
what analogous to newspapers' access to the mails at less than cost. "[G]rave consti-
tutional questions are immediately raised once it is said that the use of the mails is a
privilege which may be extended or withheld on any grounds whatsoever. . . .Under
that view the second-class rate could be granted on condition that certain economic
or political ideas not be disseminated." Hannegan v. Esquire, 327 U.S. 146, 156 (1946).
In Hannegan, the Supreme Court ruled that the government is not required to give
newspapers second-class mail rates but once it does so, the rates must be given to all
newspapers-they may not be granted or denied on a selective basis. 327 U.S. at 152,
155-56, 158. Similarly, a school board is not required to open school doors to the general
public, but once the doors are open, school facilities must be made available to all
individuals and organizations. See note 50 supra and notes 114-20 infra.
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Judge Butzner also stressed that though students and union mem-
bers possess the freedoms of speech and association, 02 public schools
and labor unions may not deny participation in their respective activ-
ities on the basis of discriminatory criteria. 03 He therefore main-
tained that political parties are likewise forbidden to discriminate. 04
In relation to public schools, racial segregation has been forbidden
because "[sleparate but equal'. . . educational facilities are inher-
ently unequal.""", With regard to labor unions and other voluntary
associational organizations, courts have ruled restrictive membership
policies invalid when membership is shown to be an economic necess-
ity or a requirement for a better job classification.01 In contrast,
however, courts have never held that membership in any particular
political party is a constitutional right. They have simply held that
neither states nor political parties performing essential state func-
tions may exclude blacks from the political process in any manner. 07
In further support of the contention that the Board was justified
in denying the Party's rental permit application, the dissent also
discussed Moose Lodge v. Irvis"'5 in some detail. In Moose Lodge, the
Supreme Court ruled that granting a state liquor license to a private
club with a discriminatory membership policy did not constitute
"state action."'"" Judge Butzner felt three distinctions could be
drawn between the situation in Moose Lodge and that in Ringers: (1)
Moose Lodge involved a private club while Ringers involved a politi-
cal organization open only to whites; (2) the Lodge used its own land
"473 F.2d at 1022, citing Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496' (1939).
"11473 F.2d at 1022, citing Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954);
Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945); United States v. International Long-
shoremen's Ass'n, 460 F.2d 497 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1007 (1972).
"'°473 F.2d at 1022.
-Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1953). "To separate [children]
from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a
feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts
and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." Id. at 494.
""'We see no constitutional basis for the contention that a state cannot protect
workers from exclusion solely on the basis of race, color or creed by an organization,
functioning under the protection of the state, which holds itself out to represent the
general business needs of employees." Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 94
(1945) (footnote omitted). See United States v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n,
460 F.2d 497, 499-500 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1007 (1972).
"Notes 94-101 supra and accompanying text. See also Comment, MacGuire v.
Amos: Application of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act to Political Parties, 8 HARv.
Civ. RTs. L. REv. 199 (1973).
'407 U.S. 163 (1972).
1'Id. at 176-77.
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while the Party desired the use of a public building for its meetings;
and (3) a liquor license did not serve to encourage public discrimina-
tion while use of a public auditorium might give added respectability
to the Party and aid in furthering its racist aims."0 The dissent
argued that these distinctions permitted a showing of "state action"
in Ringers and thereby allowed the Board to deny the Party's rental
request."' However, one further distinction should also be made-no
first amendment rights were at issue in Moose Lodge while they were
crucial in Ringers. Because of the extreme importance of first amend-
ment rights, " 2 this very significant difference vitiates the effect of the
other distinctions.
Even while arguing that the School Board could validly deny the
rental application, the dissent conceded that the National Socialist
White People's Party would have been entitled to hold its meetings
in any Arlington County park regularly used for the exercise of free
speech and the exchange of ideas." 3 Thus, the dissent attached signif-
icance to the nature of the particular forum. However, previous cases
had held that the fact that an indoor auditorium was requested
should make no difference, as long as it was also regularly used as a
public forum."4 Accordingly, the majority in Ringers refused to per-
mit walls and a roof to "insulate against" the first amendment's
requirements.15 It would not allow the amendment's protections "to
turn on structural distinctions between . . .an open public park, a
public amphitheatre, a public stadium, or an enclosed public audito-
rium."",
The majority's refusal to attach significance to the forum's struc-
ture led it to conclude that the "state action" doctrine does not ex-
tend to public facilities utilized for the purposes of free speech and
peaceful assembly."7 As the court stated, the most effective way to
expose "falsehoods and fallacies" is through education and the pro-
motion of more speech, not through state imposed silence;"' any
1"473 F.2d at 1022.
"IIld.
"2Notes 81-90 supra and accompanying text.
"'473 F.2d at 1020. See also Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Collin v.
Chicago Park Dist., 460 F.2d 746 (7th Cir. 1972).
"'Notes 50-53 supra and accompanying text.
"1473 F.2d at 1015.
Id.
"WId. at 1016.
"'Id. at 1018-19. On this point, the Fourth Circuit quoted Mr. Justice Brandeis:
"If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the
evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not
enforced silence." 473 F.2d at 1018-19 quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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identification of the school building with the Party's program would
be eliminated by the wide variety of groups using the high school
auditorium." 09 The circuit court therefore concluded that the essential
point was not that Ringers presented "insufficient state action, but
simply that the state action doctrine is not applicable where a group
seeks to exercise first amendment rights in a public forum dedicated
to that purpose."""
Conclusion
In National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, the Fourth
Circuit recognized that to find state involvement in the Party's re-
strictive membership policy, thereby allowing the School Board's
"state action" defense, was equivalent to making the Board a censor.
Such a decision would have effectively given the School Board the
power to impose prior restraints on the Party and other discrimina-
tory organizations.' 2 Under any system of censorship, those whose
rights will be denied are apt to be members of minority groups or
advocates of minority or unpopular viewpoints. Censorship power in
the hands of a school board could therefore be used to deny the first
amendment privileges of free speech and peaceful assembly to a wide
variety of private groups, including those which are constitutionally
permitted to maintain discriminatory membership policies.' 22 Fur-
"1473 F.2d at 1018. The Supreme Court has stated that broad dissemination of a
wide spectrum of "diverse and antagonistic views" is necessary to ensure the general
welfare. Id. at 1018 n.18, quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20
(1945).
12"473 F.2d at 1017, 1019. On close analysis, the court's holding is not quite as broad
as it appears. For instance, the School Board could not permit the Party to post guards
for the purpose of keeping certain persons out of its public meetings. Such knowing
acquiescence in an exclusionary policy was found to constitute "state action" in Burton
v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961). See notes 77-80 supra and
accompanying text. Furthermore, where facilities are publicly owned or operated,
individuals may not be denied access on discriminatory bases. This proposition was
acknowledged by the Party. Brief for Appellant at 24 n.19, National Socialist White
People's Party v. Ringers, 473 F.2d 1010 (4th Cir. 1973), citing Evans v. Newton, 382
U.S. 296 (1966) (public parks); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1965) (public li-
brary); Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963) (public parks); Johnson v. Virginia,
373 U.S. 61 (1963) (courtroom facilities); Turner v. Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962)
(public restaurant); Holmes v. Atlanta, 223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir.), aff'd 350 U.S. 879 (1955)
(municipal golf courses); Dawson v. Baltimore, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir.), aff'd 350 U.S.
877 (1955) (public beaches); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (public
schools).
121473 F.2d at 1016.
12Brief for Appellant at 22, National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers,
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thermore, had the "state action" defense been found valid, the court
could not logically have limited it solely to cases involving school
boards. In the future, any governmental body responsible for public
facilities would have been able to avail itself of the defense, thus
enabling both school boards and administrative agencies to control
the views expressed in public forums and to deny their use on the
basis of controversial beliefs which rental applicants might express
in those facilities.'' In other words, the "state action" defense would
allow the imposition of invalid prior restraints on free speech and
peaceful assembly,' 24 a violation of the strict neutrality that states
and their subdivisions must maintain at all times in the area of first
amendment rights.'
25
The holding allays the fears of certain organizations that they may
be denied access to public facilities because of allegations of state
involvement in their messages or programs. At the same time, the
task of administrative agencies responsible for public facilities is
made easier. Prior to Ringers, auditorium administrators were faced
with two choices: (1) they could rent public facilities to groups es-
pousing racist viewpoints and risk suit by civil rights groups; or (2)
they could refuse to rent the facilities on the grounds of "state action"
in connection with the groups' policies and risk suit by the discrimi-
natory organizations.'26 Ringers resolved this problem in favor of first
amendment interests and thereby served to reaffirm the vital import-
ance of those interests. Thus, the case extricates the public adminis-
trator from a dilemma while simultaneously adding a measure of
certainty and stability to the law. In summary, the Ringers decision,
being solidly founded in first amendment principles, recognizes that
the basic rationale underlying the first amendment would be severely
compromised if an administrative body of any kind could success-
fully assert the "state action" defense in such circumstances.
CHARLES BAILY TOMB
473 F.2d 1010 (4th Cir. 1973), citing Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). As the
brief points out, the right to maintain restrictive or discriminatory membership poli-
cies derives from the right of free association, made applicable to the states through
the fourteenth amendment. Louisiana v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293, 296 (1961); Bates v.
Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960). Such discriminatory membership policies are
invalid only when membership is shown to be an economic necessity. See note 106
supra and accompanying text.
"11473 F.2d at 1016.
1'21d. See notes 23-72 supra and accompanying text.
'-Notes 86-90 supra and accompanying text.
12'Note 20 supra.
